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Formal Concept Analysis and Resolution in
Algebraic Domains — Preliminary Report
Pascal Hitzler and Matthias Wendt
Artificial Intelligence Institute, Department of Computer Science
Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany
{phitzler,mw177754}@inf.tu-dresden.de
Abstract. We relate two formerly independent areas: Formal concept
analysis and logic of domains. We will establish a correspondene between
contextual attribute logic on formal contexts resp. concept lattices and
a clausal logic on coherent algebraic cpos. We show how to identify the
notion of formal concept in the domain theoretic setting. In particular,
we show that a special instance of the resolution rule from the domain
logic coincides with the concept closure operator from formal concept
analysis. The results shed light on the use of contexts and domains for
knowledge representation and reasoning purposes.
1 Introduction
Domain theory was introduced in the 1970s by Scott as a foundation for pro-
gramming semantics. It provides an abstract model of computation using order
structures and topology, and has grown into a respected field on the borderline
between Mathematics and Computer Science [1]. Relationships between domain
theory and logic were noted early on by Scott [2], and subsequently developed
by many authors, including Smyth [3], Abramsky [4], and Zhang [5]. There has
been much work on the use of domain logics as logics of types and of program
correctness, with a focus on functional and imperative languages.
However, there has been only little work relating domain theory to logical
aspects of knowledge representation and reasoning in artificial intelligence. Two
exceptions were the application of methods from quantitative domain theory to
the semantic analysis of logic programming paradigms studied by Hitzler and
Seda [6, 7], and the work of Rounds and Zhang on the use of domain logics for
disjunctive logic programming and default reasoning [8–10]. The latter authors
developed a notion of clausal logic in coherent algebraic domains, for convenience
henceforth called logic RZ, based on considerations concerning the Smyth pow-
erdomain, and extended it to a disjunctive logic programming paradigm [10].
A notion of default negation, in the spirit of answer set programming [11] and
Reiter’s default logic [12], was also added [13].
The notion of formal concept evolved out of the philosophical theory of con-
cepts. Wille [14] proposed the main ideas which lead to the development of formal
concept analysis as a mathematical field [15]. The underlying philosophical ra-
tionale is that a concept is determined by its extent, i.e. the collection of objects
2 P. Hitzler and M. Wendt
which fall under this concept, and its intent, i.e. the collection of properties or
attributes covered by this concept. Thus, a formal concept is usually distilled
out of an incidence relation between a set of objects and a set of attributes via
some concept closure operator, see Section 2 for details. The set of all concepts
is then a complete lattice under some natural order, called a concept lattice.
The concept closure operator can naturally be represented by an implica-
tional theory of attributes, e.g. the attribute “is a dog” would imply the at-
tribute “is a mammal”, to give a simple example. Thus, contexts and concepts
determine logical structures, which are investigated e.g. in [16–18]. In this pa-
per, we establish a close relationship between the logical consequence relation in
the logic RZ and the construction of concepts from contexts via the mentioned
concept closure operator. We will show that finite contexts can be mapped nat-
urally to certain partial orders such that the concept closure operator coincides
with a special instance of a resolution rule in the logic RZ, and that the concept
lattice of the given context arises as a certain set of logically closed theories.
Conversely, we will see how the logic RZ on finite pointed posets finds a natural
representation as a context. Finally, we will also see how the contextual attribute
logic due to Ganter and Wille [16] reappears in our setting.
Due to the natural capabilities of contexts and concepts for knowledge repre-
sentation, and the studies by Rounds and Zhang on the relevance of the logic RZ
for reasoning mentioned above, the result shows the potential of using domain
logics for knowledge representation and reasoning. As such, the paper is part of
our investigations concerning the use of domain theory in artificial intelligence,
where domains shall be used for knowledge representation, and domain logic for
reasoning. The contribution of this paper is on the knowledge representation
aspect, more precisely on using domains for representing knowledge which is
implicit in formal contexts. Aspects of reasoning, building on the clausal logic
of Rounds and Zhang and its extensions, as mentioned above, are being pursued
and will be presented elsewhere, and some general considerations can be found
in the conclusions. We also note that our results may make way for the use of
formal concept analysis for domain-theoretic program analysis, and this issue is
also to be taken up elsewhere.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide preliminaries and
notation from lattice theory, formal concept analysis, and domain theory, which
will be needed throughout the paper. In Section 3, we will identify certain logi-
cally closed theories from the logic RZ, called singleton-generated theories, and
show that the set of all these coincides with the Dedekind-MacNeille completion
of the underlying finite poset. This sets the stage for the central Section 4 where
we will present the main results on the correspondence between concept closure
and logical consequence in the logic RZ, as mentioned above. In Section 5 we
shortly exhibit how the contextual attribute logic relates to our setting. Finally,
in Section 6, we conclude with a general discussion on knowledge representation
and reasoning perspectives of our work, and display some of the difficulties in-
volved in carrying over the results to the infinite case. Some parts of the proofs
have only been sketched for page limitations.
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2 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Lattice Theory
Our general reference for lattice theory is [19]. A preorder is a pair (P,≤), where
≤ is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on P . A partially ordered set (poset)
is a preorder, where ≤ is also antisymmetric. A poset (P,≤) is called finite if so
is P . We call a poset pointed if it has a least, or bottom element, i.e. an element
⊥ with ⊥ ≤ x for all x ∈ P . A lattice is a poset such that for any two elements
a, b of the lattice there always exists an infimum a∧b, called the meet of a and b,
and a supremum a∨ b, called the join of a and b. A lattice is said to be complete
if moreover meet and join of any collection of elements exist.
For a poset P , we denote by ↑X = {y | x ≤ y for some x ∈ X} the up-
per closure of X , and by X↑ = {y | x ≤ y for all x ∈ X} the (set of) upper
bounds of X , and for singleton sets X = {x} we write ↑ x and x↑ (which in
this case coincide) for simplicity. The notions of lower closure and lower bounds
are obtained dually. A subset P ⊆ L of a lattice L is called join-dense in L if
each element of L is the join of some elements from P . For a poset P and an
embedding f : P → L, we call f a join-dense embedding if the image of P under
f is join-dense in L. An element x ∈ L of a lattice L is called join-irreducible if
x cannot be obtained as the join of two elments distinct from x. The notions of
meet-density and meet-irreducibility are obtained dually. For a given poset P ,
a pair (X, Y ) of subsets of P is called a (Dedekind) cut in P if X = Y ↓ and
Y = X↑. The set of all cuts in a poset P , ordered by subset inclusion in the first
argument — or equivalently by reverse subset inclusion in the second — is called
the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of P , denoted by N (P ). It is the smallest
complete lattice P can be embedded into, namely by the principal ideal embed-
ding ι : P → N (P ) : x 
→ (↓ x, ↑x), which preserves existing joins and meets.
Since any cut (X, Y ) ∈ N (P ) is determined by X , we will for convenience write
X ∈ N (P ), so that e.g. the principal ideal embedding takes the form x 
→ ↓x.
Note also that for any complete lattice L and any set P which embeds both join-
and meet-densely into L we have that N (P ) is isomorphic to L.
2.2 Formal Contexts and Concepts
We introduce basic notions from formal concept analysis, following the standard
reference [15].
A (formal) context is a triple (G, M, I) consisting of two sets G and M and
a relation I ⊆ G×M . The elements of G are called the objects and the elements
of M are called the attributes of the context. For g ∈ G and m ∈ M we write
gIm for (g, m) ∈ I, and say that g has the attribute m.
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For a set A ⊆ G of objects we set A′ = {m ∈M | gIm for all g ∈ A}, and for
a set B ⊆M of attributes we set B′ = {g ∈ G | gIm for all m ∈ B}. A (formal)
concept of (G, M, I) is a pair (A, B) with A ⊆ G and B ⊆M , such that A′ = B
and B′ = A. We call A the extent and B the intent of the concept (A, B). For
singleton sets, i.e. B = {b}, we simplify notation by writing b′ instead of {b}′.
The set of all concepts of a given context (G, M, I), ordered by (A1, B1) ≤
(A2, B2) if and only if A1 ⊆ A2, which is equivalent to the condition B2 ⊆ B1, is
a complete lattice and is denoted by B(G, M, I). It is called the concept lattice
of the context (G, M, I), and the following theorem holds, which is a part of the
so-called Basic Theorem of formal concept analysis.
Theorem 1. A complete lattice L is isomorphic to B(G, M, I) if and only if
there are mappings γ : G→ L and μ : M → L such that γ(G) is join-dense and
μ(M) is meet-dense in L and gIm is equivalent to γ(g) ≤ μ(m).
In particular, we note that in the setting of Theorem 1 we have that L is
isomorphic to the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of the subposet μ(M)∪ γ(G)
of L.
Finally, an object g is called irreducible if the respective object concept (g′′, g′)
is join-irreducible in B(G, M, I). Dually, an attribute m is called irreducible if
the respective attribute concept (m′, m′′) is meet-irreducible in B(G, M, I). On
finite contexts, we have that for every reducible object g, i.e. one which is not
irreducible, there exists a set of irreducible objects H such that H ′ = g′, and
likewise for attributes.
2.3 The Logic RZ
In [10], Rounds and Zhang developed a clausal logic on certain partial orders
which allows a logical characterization of a standard domain-theoretic notion,
namely of the Smyth powerdomain of these posets. They also noted, and studied,
that their clausal logic, which we call the logic RZ, bears potential for estab-
lishing a disjunctive logic programming paradigm based on a domain-theoretic
background. We will next define those notions from their work which we will use
in the sequel. Our discussion, however, will mostly be restricted to the case of
finite pointed posets instead of the more general coherent algebraic cpos which
provide the original setting for the logic RZ. A short discussion of this is deferred
to Section 6.
Definition 1. Let (P,) be a finite pointed poset. A clause over P is a subset
of P . A theory over P is a set of clauses over P . For a clause X and m ∈ P ,
we say that m is a model of X, written m |= X, if there exists some x ∈ X with
x  m. For a theory T and m ∈ P , we set m |= T if m |= X for all X ∈ T ,
in which case we call m a model of T . For a theory T and a clause X we say
that X is a logical consequence of T , written T |= X, if for all m ∈ P we have
that m |= T implies m |= X. A theory T is said to be logically closed if T |= X
implies X ∈ T for all clauses X. Given a theory S, we say that T is the logical
closure of S if T is the smallest logically closed theory containing S. A theory is
called consistent if it does not have the empty clause as a logical consequence.
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For a theory T , we will denote the set of models of T by Mod(T ). Similarly,
given a set M ⊆ P of models, we define the corresponding theory Th(M) to
be the set of all clauses which have all elements of M as model. Note that for
every M ⊆ P the corresponding theory Th(M) contains the clause {⊥}, hence
is non-empty. A central result from [10] is that the set of all consistent and
logically closed theories over P , under subset inclusion, is isomorphic to the
Smyth powerdomain of P .
3 Singleton-Generated Theories and Poset Completion
In this section, we will show a strong relationship between the logic RZ and poset
completion. In particular we show that a set of certain theories is isomorphic to
the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of the given poset. Due to the strong link
between concept lattices and the Dedekind-MacNeille completion exhibited by
Theorem 1, this will provide the necessary tool for our main results, presented
in Section 4.
The intuition underlying our observations is that (e.g. classical) logic gives
rise to a natural Galois connection between models and theories. In the setting
of the logic RZ, this Galois connection arises by representing the Smyth power-
domain of P , together with the inconsistent closed theory, as the concept lattice
of the formal context (P, C, |=), where C is the set of all clauses over P — formal
concepts over this context are pairs (M, T ) of sets of models and logically closed
theories such that m |= T if and only if m ∈M . Since theories can be thought of
as conjunctions of clauses, this yields a Galois connection between conjunctions
and their sets of models. Moreover, from the fact that in our special setting
elements of clauses and models of theories are drawn from the same set P it
will turn out that the Galois connection between conjunctions and their models
arises from the formal context (P, S, |=), where S denotes the set of all singleton
clauses over P . This idea will be pursued in detail below.
So we will now look at the analogon to conjunction in the logic RZ, which
is provided by (finite) theories containing only singleton clauses. Given a finite
pointed poset P we will call a logically closed theory T over P singleton-generated
if and only if there exists a set M = {{d1}, . . . , {dn}}, where n ∈ N and di ∈ P
for each i, such that T is the logical closure of M , and in this case we call
{d1, . . . , dn} a generator of T . For any given logically closed theory S we also
set G(S) = {d | {d} ∈ S}, and note that G(S) is a generator of S if and only
if S is singleton-generated. This definition has been developed out of a closure
operator defined in [20]. Now the following theorem can be established.
Theorem 2. Let P be a finite pointed poset. Then the following hold.
(i) A logically closed theory T over P is singleton-generated with generator G
if and only if Mod(T ) = G↑.
(ii)
(G(T ),G(T )↑) is a cut in P for every logically closed theory T .
(iii) For every cut (X, Y ) in P we have that Th(Y ) is singleton-generated and
G(Th(Y )) = X.
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(iv) The set of all singleton-generated theories of a finite pointed poset P , or-
dered by subset inclusion, is isomorphic to the Dedekind-MacNeille com-
pletion N (P ) of P .
Proof. First note that given a logically closed theory T we trivially have m |= {d}
for all m ∈ Mod(T ) and all {d} ∈ T , hence Mod(T ) ⊆ G(T )↑.
(i) If T is singleton generated, then we additionally have that every upper
bound of G(T ) must be a model of T . Conversely, let Mod(T ) = G↑ for some
logically closed theory T and some G ⊆ P , and let S be generated by G. Then
every model m of S is a model for all {d} with d ∈ G, hence m ∈ G↑ = Mod(T ).
Likewise, every model m of T is contained in G↑ and is therefore a model of S.
So S and T coincide.
(ii) Let T be logically closed. It suffices to show that G(T ) = G(T )↑↓. By
definition of |= and logical closure we have that {d} ∈ T iff d ∈Mod(T )↓. Since
Mod(T ) ⊆ G(T )↑ we obtain Mod(T )↓ ⊇ G(T )↑↓, hence G(T ) ⊇ G(T )↑↓ and so
equality.
(iii) Trivially, Y ⊆ Mod(Th(Y )). We obtain Y ⊇ Mod(Th(Y )), and hence
equality, since there exists a clause C with Y = ↑C and C ∈ Th(Y ), which
implies that every m ∈ Mod(Th(Y )) satisfies m |= C and therefore m ∈ Y . By
X↑ = Y = Mod(Th(Y )) and because Th(Y ) is logically closed we obtain from
(i) that Th(Y ) is singleton-generated with generator X . Furthermore, we have
{x} ∈ Th(Y ) if and only if x ∈ Y ↓ = X , so G(Th(Y )) = X .
(iv) For every singleton-generated theory T let ι(T ) = (G(T ), Mod(T )). Using
(i), (ii), and (iii) it is easily shown that ι is an isomorphism as required.
Before we make use of Theorem 2 in the next section, let us briefly reflect
on what we have achieved so far. Identifying singleton-generated theories with
cuts yields the possibility of representing finite lattices — which are always com-
plete — by means of finite pointed posets. From an order-theoretic point of view
this idea appears to be rather straightforward. Relating this setting to a logic
of domains, however, provides a novel aspect. On the one hand, we now have
the possibility to use a restricted form of resolution on ordered sets — as will
be explained in Section 4 — in order to represent elements of the corresponding
Dedekind-MacNeille completion. On the other hand, we obtain a new perspec-
tive on the logic RZ, namely that underlying posets can be interpreted from a
knowledge representation point of view. In the next section, we will show how
Theorem 2 can be employed for relating the logic RZ to formal concept analysis.
The following corollary to Theorem 2 will also be helpful. It follows immediately
from part (iv) of Theorem 2 together with the remark on the Dedekind-MacNeille
completion provided at the end of Section 2.1, noting that every finite lattice is
complete.
Corollary 1. Let L be a finite lattice. Then for every finite pointed poset P
which can be embedded join- and meet-densely into L, the set of all singleton-
generated theories over P is isomorphic to L.
Now every complete lattice is the concept lattice of some formal context.
We can thus interpret the elements of the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of
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a pointed poset P , which can in turn be identified with singleton-generated
theories over P , as concepts in the corresponding concept lattice. This indicates
that the logic RZ might be used as a knowledge representation formalism. The
details of the relationship between the logic RZ on finite pointed posets and
concept lattices will be explained in greater detail in the next section.
4 Representation of Formal Contexts by Finite Posets
We will establish a connection between finite posets and formal contexts, showing
that the logic RZ can be understood from a knowledge representation perspec-
tive. As we have seen in Theorem 2, the set of all singleton-generated theories
over a finite pointed poset P is isomorphic to the Dedekind-MacNeille comple-
tion N (P ) of P , which will be the central insight needed for our results. In order
to make explicit in which way conceptual knowledge is represented in P , we have
to identify objects and attributes within P , as follows.
Definition 2. Let P be a finite pointed poset. An element x ∈ P is called an
attribute if it is not the join of all elements strictly below it, and similarly it is
called an object if it is not the meet of all elements strictly above it.
The main motivation behind this definition is as follows: In concept lat-
tices, every join-irreducible element corresponds to some object and every meet-
irreducible element corresponds to some attribute. Hence we seek to identify
those elements in P which correspond to the meet- resp. join-irreducible ele-
ments of N (P ). Considering the principal ideal embedding of P into N (P ), we
observe that an element x ∈ P for which (↓ x, ↑ x) is meet-irreducible in N (P )
cannot be the meet of all elements strictly above it. Dualizing the latter — in
order to take care of ordering conventions in the different fields — yields the
intuition underlying Definition 2.
From the definition of attribute it follows immediately that any singleton-
generated theory over P is completely determined by the set of attributes it
contains as singletons: any singleton which is not an attribute can be represented
as the join of all the attributes below it, hence is derivable from these attributes
in the logic RZ. This is stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let P be a finite pointed poset and T1, T2 be two singleton-generated
theories over P which coincide on all attributes of P . Then T1 = T2.
Proof. Assume {x} ∈ T1 for some non-attribute x ∈ P . Now x is the join of all
the attributes below it, and by logical closure {m} ∈ T1 for all attributes m ≤ x,
hence {m} ∈ T2 for all attributes m ≤ x. So by logical closure of T2 we obtain
{x} ∈ T2. The argument clearly reverses and therefore suffices.
At this stage our way of interpreting singleton-generated theories as concepts
becomes almost obvious. An object g ∈ P is in the extent of a concept (i.e.
of a singleton-generated theory) T if g |= T , and an attribute m ∈ P is in
the intent of a concept T if {m} ∈ T . The latter means that every object
8 P. Hitzler and M. Wendt
in the extent of T necessarily has attribute m. Furthermore, if an object g is
contained as a singleton in a theory, then it is necessary for any other object in
the corresponding concept extent to have all the attributes g has. If an attribute
is a model for a theory, then any object having this attribute is also a model of
the theory.
When reasoning about the knowledge represented in a poset P , we can —
according to Lemma 1 — restrict our attention to the attributes. But we can
also incorporate the objects into the reasoning, if desired, as a kind of macros
for a collection of attributes. This perspective will be employed later on when
discussing the logic programming framework developed by Rounds and Zhang
[10] in terms of formal concept analysis.
Theorem 3. Let (G, M, I) be a finite formal context. Then B(G, M, I), under
the reverse order, is isomorphic to the set of all singleton-generated theories of a
finite pointed poset P , under subset inclusion, if and only if there exist mappings
γ : Girr → P and μ : Mirr → P , where Girr resp. Mirr denote the irreducible
objects resp. attributes of (G, M, I), such that the following conditions hold.
(i) γ(Girr) resp. μ(Mirr) contain the objects resp. attributes of P according to
Definition 2.
(ii) For all g ∈ Girr and m ∈Mirr we have gIm if and only if γ(g) ≥ μ(m).
In particular, for a finite pointed poset P with objects G and attributes M ,
the set of all singleton-generated theories over P under reverse subset inclusion
is isomorphic to B(G, M, I), where I is the restriction of ≥ to G×M .
Moreover, for a finite pointed poset P with objects G and attributes M we
have that (X, Y ) is a concept of the corresponding context if and only if there
exists a singleton generated theory T with X = G(T )∩M and Y = Mod(T )∩G.
Proof. For the if -direction of the first part, let (P,≤) be a finite poset and note
that any join-irreducible element of N (P ) must be in the image of P under the
principal ideal embedding ι, since ι embeds P join- and meet-densely in N (P ).
We first show that whenever ↓m ∈ N (P ) is join-irreducible, then m is an
attribute of P . So assume the converse, namely that m is the join of all elements
strictly below it. Since the principal ideal embedding ι preserves existing joins
and meets, ↓m is the join of all ↓x, where x < m, inN (P ). Thus, using finiteness,
↓m cannot be join-irreducible in N (P ). Reasoning dually for the objects shows
that each meet-irreducible element of N (P ) is the image of an object of P .
We next define a mapping μ : M → N (P ). For m ∈Mirr let μ(m) = ↓μ(m).
From the argument just given we obtain that μ(Mirr) is join-dense in N (P ). For
m ∈M \Mirr we have that m is a reducible attribute, i.e. there exists N ⊆Mirr
with N ′ = m′. In this case, let μ(m) =
⋃{↓μ(n) | n ∈ N}, and μ is easily shown
to be well-defined. The mapping γ : G→ N (P ) is obtained dually.
It is now straightforward to verify that γ and μ satisfy the duals of the
conditions from Theorem 1, the application of which yields that B(G, M, I) is
isomorphic to the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of P under the reverse order.
Conversely, let B(G, M, I) be isomorphic, under the reverse ordering, to the
set of all singleton-generated theories, under subset inclusion, of some finite
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pointed poset P . By Theorems 1 and 2 this implies that there are mappings
γ : G → N (P ) and μ : M → N (P ) such that γ(G) is meet-dense and μ(M) is
join-dense in N (P ), and such that gIm is equivalent to γ(G) ≥ μ(M). These
mappings restrict to mappings from the set of irreducible objects resp. attributes
to meet- resp. join-irreducible elements of N (P ). Since P embeds join- and meet-
densely into N (P ), every join- resp. meet-irreducible element of N (P ) is the
image of an attribute resp. object in P , which proves the claim.
The second part is a direct consequence of the first part, using Theorem 2.
The final statement is a reformulation of Theorem 2, using the observation
from Lemma 1 that we can ignore non-attributes when generating theories. A
similar argument shows that the sets of models of singleton-generated theories
are determined by the objects they contain.
Next, we will give a specific example for a construction of a finite pointed
poset from a given context (G, M, I). Note that also B(G, M, I), reversely or-
dered, is a finite pointed poset trivially satisfying the conditions from Theorem 3.
Example 1. Let (G, M, I) be a formal context, where G and M are finite and
disjoint. Define the following ordering on G ∪̇M :
(i) For m1, m2 ∈M let m1 ≤ m2 if m′1 ⊇ m′2.
(ii) For g1, g2 ∈ G let g1 ≤ g2 if g′1 ⊆ g′2.
(iii) For g ∈ G and m ∈M let m ≤ g if gIm.
(iv) For g ∈ G and m ∈ M let g ≤ m if for all h ∈ G and all n ∈ M we have
that gIn and hIm imply hIn.1
The above construction yields a preorder on G ∪̇ M . We obtain from this a
partial order, also denoted by ≤, by taking the quotient order in the usual way.
If (G ∪̇ M/∼,≤) does not have a least element, we add ⊥ to G ∪̇ M/∼ and
set ⊥ ≤ x for all x ∈ G ∪̇ M/∼. The latter amounts to adding an additional
attribute m with m′ = G to the context.
The main intuition behind this construction is to use the set consisting of all
objects and attributes as a join- and meet-dense subset of the concept lattice
and to supply the induced order by constructions directly available from the
formal context. The first three items do exactly this. However, we have to take
care of those elements which are both join- and meet-irreducible in the concept
lattice. This is achieved with (iv) and the quotient order construction, where
those object-attribute pairs are identified which will result in doubly irreducible
elements. The following proposition shows that Example 1 is correct.
Proposition 1. The poset P = (G ∪̇M/∼,≤) as defined in Example 1 satisfies
the properties from the first part of Theorem 3.
Proof. The mapping μ : Mirr → P is defined by μ(m) = [m], where [m] denotes
the equivalence class of m under ∼. Likewise, set γ : Girr → P : g 
→ [g]. We need
1 Bernhard Ganter personal communication.
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to verify that μ and γ satisfy the properties from the first part of Theorem 3.
The second stated property that gIm if and only if γ(g) ≥ μ(m) clearly holds.
So let [x] be an attribute of P according to Definition 2. If x ∈ Mirr, then
there is nothing to show. If x ∈ M \Mirr, then x is a reducible attribute, so
there exists a set N ⊆ Mirr with N ′ = x′. From x′ =
⋂
n∈N n
′ we obtain
[x] =
∨
n∈N [n], which contradicts that x is an attribute of P . So x ∈M \Mirr.
Finally, consider the case x ∈ G. If there is y ∈ Mirr with [y] = [x] then
again there is nothing to show. So assume that this is not the case, which means
that by the argument from the preceeding paragraph we have y ∈ G for all y
with [y] = [x]. Now from the fact that [x] is an attribute of P we obtain that
either there exists [y] ∈ P such that [y] ≤ [z] < [x] implies [y] = [z] for all z, or
↓[x] \ {[x]} has minimal upper bounds different from [x].
In the first case, if y ∈ G then for every m ∈ M with xIm we have yIm
by (iii), i.e. x′ ⊆ y′ and by (ii) we obtain [x] ≤ [y], hence [x] = [y], which is
impossible. If y ∈M then let h ∈ G and n ∈M with xIn and hIy. By (iii) and
(i) we obtain [n] ≤ [y] and by (iii) and (ii) we obtain [x] ≤ [h] and hIn by (iii).
So [x] ≤ [y] by (iv) which again is impossible.
In the second case, let [y] be a minimal upper bound of ↓[x] \ {[x]} different
from [x]. If y ∈ G then by (iii) we obtain x′ ⊆ y′, hence [x] ≤ [y] by (ii), which
is impossible. If y ∈ M then let h ∈ G and n ∈ M with xIn and hIy. By (iii)
and (i) we obtain [n] ≤ [y] and by (iii) and (ii) we obtain [x] ≤ [h] and hIn by
(iii). So [x] ≤ [y] by (iv) which again is impossible.
We have just concluded the proof that whenever [x] is an attribute of P then
x ∈ Mirr. A similar reasoning shows that whenever [y] is an object in P then
y ∈ Girr. So Theorem 3 is applicable.
Having established Theorem 3 as a link between the logic RZ and formal
concept analysis, we will now discuss how the different techniques on both sides
embed. In particular, we will shortly consider a proof theory for the logic RZ,
discussed next, and also the contextual attribute logic of formal concept analysis,
discussed in Section 5.
In [10], the following hyperresolution rule was presented:
X1 X2 . . . Xn; ai ∈ Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; mub{a1, . . . , an} |= Y
Y ∪⋃1≤i≤n(Xi \ {ai})
In words, this rule says that from clauses X1, . . . , Xn, ai ∈ Xi for all i, and
mub{a1, . . . , an} |= Y with respect to the logic RZ, the clause Y ∪
⋃
1≤i≤n(Xi \
{ai}) may be derived. This rule, together with two special rules treating the cases
of an empty selection of clauses resp. an empty clause in the premise of the rule,
yields a proof theory resp. entailment relation  which is sound and complete
w.r.t. the model theory given in Definition 1. From our results, in particular from
Theorem 3, we obtain that the following restriction of the hyperresolution rule
to singleton clauses induces an entailment relation s which is equivalent to the
concept closure operator (·)′′ : P(M)→ P(M) which maps any set of attributes
B to the intent B′′ of the corresponding concept (B′, B′′):
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{a1} {a2} . . . {an}; mub{a1, . . . , an} |= {a}
{a}
Thus we can conclude that the logic RZ can be used for knowledge representa-
tion in much the same way as formal concept analysis: There is a correspondence
between finite formal contexts and finite pointed posets and, moreover, both the
proof and the model theory of [10] lend themselves to an easy characterization
of concept closure. This is probably not too surprising from the viewpoint of
formal concept analysis resp. lattice theory. However, from the viewpoint of do-
main theory it is certainly interesting that there is such a close correspondence
between domain logics developed for reasoning about program semantics [4] and
a knowledge representation mechanism like formal concept analysis.
5 Contextual Attribute Logic and the Logic RZ
In this section, we will show that the correspondence between the logic RZ and
formal concept analysis is not exhausted by the relationship between singleton-
generated theories and concept closure. In particular, we will show how to iden-
tify part of the contextual attribute logic due to [16] in a finite pointed poset
P by means of the logic RZ. We first show how clauses and theories resemble
constructions of compound attributes in the poset.
In [16], compound attributes are defined to be compositions of attributes
w.r.t. their extent. More precisely, for any set A ⊆ M of attributes of a formal
context (G, M, I), the compound attribute
∨
A has the extent
⋃{m′ | m ∈ A},
and the compound attribute
∧
A has the extent
⋂{m′ | m ∈ A}. For an attribute
m ∈M , the compound attribute ¬m has the extent G \m′.
Now we can relate compound attributes and theories in the logic RZ by
the following proposition, which is in fact a straightforward consequence of our
previous results, so we skip the proof.
Proposition 2. Let P be a finite pointed poset and consider the formal context
(G, M, I) obtained from it as indicated in Theorem 3, and let γ, μ be as in the
same theorem. Then for all A ⊆M , g ∈ G, and m ∈M the following hold.
– g is in the extent of
∨
A if and only if γ(g) |= μ(A).
– g is in the extent of
∧
A if and only if γ(g) |= {{μ(a)} | a ∈ A}.
– g is in the extent of ¬m if and only if γ(g) |= {μ(m)}.
We thus see, that the formation of conjunction and disjunction of attributes
to compound attributes corresponds exactly to the formation of singleton gen-
erated theories resp. clauses. Negation, however, is more difficult to represent
in the logic RZ, since the set of all models of ¬m is not an upper set, but a
lower set, more precisely it is the complement of a principal filter in P . Thus
it seems that the Scott topology, on which the logic RZ is implicitly based, is
not appropriate for handling this kind of negation — which could be a candiate
for a strong negation in the logic programming paradigm discussed in Section
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6. It remains to be investigated whether the results presented in [10] carry over
to the Lawson topology and the Plotkin powerdomain, which according to what
has been said above may be the correct setting for handling this negation.
In [16], sequents of the form (A, S), where A, S ⊆ M , were introduced as a
possible reading of compound attributes
∨
(S∪{¬m | m ∈ A}). A sequent (A, S)
may thus be interpreted as an implication
∨
S ← ∧ A. A clause set over M is
a set of sequents over M . The clause logic, called contextual attribute logic, of a
finite pointed poset P is then the set of all sequents that are all-extensional in
P , i.e. all sequents whose extent contains the set of all objects of P . This means
that the implication represented by the sequent holds for all the objects in P .
Due to the difficulties with negation discussed above we restrict our attention,
for the time being, to all-extensional sequents (A, S) with A = ∅. So consider
again the setting of Proposition 2, and let X ⊆ M . Then (∅, X) is an all-
extensional sequent if and only if γ(x) |= μ(X) for all x ∈ G. This is easily
verified using Theorem 3 and Proposition 2.
Apart from investigating compound attributes involving negation — as dis-
cussed above — it also remains to be determined whether there exists a way of
identifying the contextual attribute logic by means of the proof theory defined
by Rounds and Zhang [10]. This will be subject to further research.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We have displayed a strong relationship between formal concept analysis and
the domain logic RZ. The restriction of inference to singleton clauses yields the
concept closure operator of formal concept analysis. Furthermore, any logically
closed theory in the logic RZ can be understood as a clause set over a formal
context, in the sense of contextual attribute logic, and the hyperresolution rule
of [10] can be used to reason about such knowledge present in a given formal
context in much the same way as the resolution rule proposed in [16]. This of
course can be a foundation for logic programming over formal contexts, i.e. logic
programming with background knowledge which is taken from a formal context
and used as “hard constraints”.
The appropriate way of doing this on domains was also studied by Rounds
and Zhang. In their logic programming paradigm on coherent algebraic cpos a
logic program is a set of rules of the form θ ← τ , where θ and τ are clauses over
the respective domain. The rule
X1 X2 . . . Xn; ai ∈ Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; θ ← τ ∈ P ; mub{a1, . . . , an} |= τ
θ ∪⋃1≤i≤n(Xi \ {ai})
corresponds to inference taking the clause θ ← τ into account. By adjoining to
the usual proof theory the inference rules for all the clauses in a given program,
one can define a monotonic and continuous operator TP on the set of all logically
closed theories, whose least fixed point yields a very satisfactory semantics, i.e.
model, for the considered program P .
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This logic programming paradigm can be understood as logic programming
with background knowledge, since the least model of the program is not only a
model for the program, in a reasonable sense, but also takes into account those
implications which are hidden in the underlying domain, i.e. in the context.
It is interesting to note that the knowledge implicit in the context need not be
made explicit, e.g. by computing the stem base of the context. This implicational
knowledge is implicitly represented by the inference rules constituting the proof
theory of the logic RZ. The authors are currently investigating the potential of
this approach.
In this paper, we have restricted our considerations to the case of finite
pointed posets. So let us shortly discuss some of the difficulties involved in car-
rying over our results to the case of arbitrary coherent algebraic cpos. The corre-
spondence between singleton-generated theories and cuts from Theorem 2 carries
over to the infinite case without major restrictions — one just has to correctly
adjust it to compact elements and to keep in mind that any non-compact element
can be represented as the supremum of all compact elements below it. Difficulties
occur when trying to characterize the lattices which arise as Dedekind-MacNeille
completions of coherent algebraic cpos, since on the domain-theoretic side one
has to deal with the topological notion of coherence, which is not really present
on the lattice-theoretic side. Furthermore, the Scott-topology we are implicitly
dealing with when working with the logic RZ is not completion invariant, which
means that the properties defined in terms of the Scott topology, e.g. continuity
of the poset, do not carry over to the completion [21]. These issues will also have
to be subject to further research. A construction similar to Example 1 carries
over to a restricted infinite case, and details can be found in [20].
We finally note the very recent paper by Zhang [22], which also studies re-
lationships between domain theory and formal concept analysis, though from a
very different perspective involving Chu spaces.
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